INTRODUCTION
. 5 Indeed, I agree that " [t] he legal profession should be ashamed that the short 30-year history of affirmative action programs . . . has created more uproar within the legal community than the 300 years of racial animus and At the risk of stripping an historical observation of its historical context, 6 this Essay suggests that a description of constitutionalism in the British imperial and American colonial eras provides a useful analytic leitmotif with which to understand and define popular constitutionalism today. I argue that dominant theories of popular constitutionalism today can be understood--and the borders they share with the wider corpus of studies on constitutional change can be demarcated--by reference to the glass-case/among-people distinction Dan Hulsebosch draws in the epigram above. 7 I do not revisit the history or historiography that gave rise to this distinction. Rather, I employ the distinction only as shorthand to categorize forms of constitutional change into two models. coherence is a prerequisite to examining the MCRI's merits. Without disaggregating these models, we risk collapsing the MCRI's effects into the analytic black hole of "what the people want." Instead, the changes wrought by the MCRI must be debated on their own terms so their consequences can be understood, minimized, and eventually reversed. 193, 193, 197-204 (1993) . 7 Indeed, Kramer also uses this historical distinction. It is in large part because Kramer's version of popular constitutionalism is grounded in this history that it makes sense to characterize his modern-era popular constitutionalism as about being among people. See infra Part I. 8 I understand this use of historical scholarship not to run aground of the very persuasive criticisms that Reid (and others) raise against "law office history," supra note 6, because I base my analogical analysis on Hulsebosch's language, not on any normative claims grounded on his (decontextualized) historical material.
Imbuing the MCRI with the air of popular constitutionalism makes it more difficult to make this criticism because our democratic sensibilities render us hesitant to question expressions of "popular will." There is a tension between these democratic sensibilities and what we generally presume the function of constitutions to be, namely, to lay down basic law dictating how government will work, and to protect basic fundamental rights from majoritarian tendencies. We care about both of these issues, but we cannot escape the tension that results.
Our challenge is to balance them.
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Americans are notably proud of their federal Constitution and proud of the fact that they live in a constitutional democracy. We think of constitutions as sacrosanct founding documents that tell us who we are; we place them at the center of our founding narrative and use them to justify our American exceptionalism. 10 We are proud that we are a nation that both operates under law and order, and that also protects individual liberties.
Popular constitutionalism and initiative constitutionalism advance substantially different models for tempering democracy and other fundamental values. To conflate these models is to eliminate our chance to debate the merits of each, and instead to assume that each of their products has balanced democracy and other fundamental values in the same (and proper) way.
This assumption is worth questioning. In bypassing the affirmative action debate, then, I seek 9 As Richard Primus has argued: "Taking constitutionalism seriously entails the willingness to temper simple democracy with other fundamental values. We love our Constitution, and we love democracy. But we cannot square the circle." Richard Primus, Book Review, In the Beginnings, 234 NEW REPUBLIC 27, 33 (Apr. 24, 2006) (reviewing AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005)). To be clear, however, Primus views as "a romantic obfuscation" popular constitutionalism's attempt to dissolve the problem that "democratic legitimacy" is incompatible with the fact people no longer living ratified the U.S. Constitution and all but a few of its amendments. See id. at 30. 10 Consider the introduction to the first of the Federalist Papers, which equates the U.S. Constitution and the American empire:
AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficiency of the subsisting federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the world.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (1999). emocracy requires a mix of both order (law, structure, and constraint) and openness (politics, fluidity, and receptivity to novel forms)."). 16 Kramer, Circa 2004, supra note 11, at 983. 17 See Siegel, Social Movement Conflict, supra note 11, at 1324 n.5.
they disagree, because they share a commitment to constitutions among people: So long ours is a country of popular sovereignty, they assert, the basic law under which government functions must derive its force and meaning from The People. This requires more than mere passive acceptance of the extant constitutional order, and requires citizens' engagement as the hallmark of democratic legitimacy.
A. Establishing Popular Constitutionalism
This Essay grounds its discussion of popular constitutionalism in the scholarship of two authors whose work can fairly be described as dominant in this project: Larry Kramer and Reva In this model, the line between constitutional law and mere political law blurs. Indeed, the essential point of popular constitutionalism is its recognition of distinctly constitutional value in activity too often understood as having none. As the gap between The People and the Constitution narrows, conventional pathologies preventing us from linking politics and the Constitution will also fade. 22 Kramer grounds his popular constitutionalism in the Founding era.
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He valorizes citizens who acted in a manner that embodied--tangibly--their constitution, a legal instrument whose "day-to-day enforcement" and meaning The People effected with their daily actions. 24 In that era, "[m]eans of correction and forms of resistance were well established and highly structured," and included voting, assembling and petitioning, and public denouncement. 25 When public dissatisfaction did not find sufficient outlet in pamphlets and the voting booth, there were "more assertive forms of resistance." Mere disobedience or explicit rejection of local authorities often sufficed when, for example, a prosecutor sought to indict and convict an individual the community thought should not be punished. 26 And The People could raise the stakes even higher: "more coercive means of popular opposition were available," like boycotts and mobbing. These activists' goal was to effect changes in "fundamental law." Unlike "ordinary law"
passed by duly constituted governmental bodies (legislatures) to regulate people, "fundamental law" was the law governing the governors. 32 Under the theory of popular sovereignty on which the American Constitution was written and ratified, Kramer argues, it was this "fundamental law" that The People owned, and whose meaning The People had the power to make. 33 In this era, this "fundamental law" lived among people.
Kramer argues that the Constitution's character as "fundamental law" was lost when "the critical linguistic difference between [the Constitution] and ordinary law blurred" under the enforce laws the community deemed unconstitutional."); Kramer, We The Court, supra note 11, at 100-01 ("the jury . . . used its power to retain control over substantive law"). 27 34 Kramer, We The Court, supra note 11, at 99. See also KRAMER, PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 11, at 148-56 (discussing "conceptual absorption of the Constitution into ordinary law"). 35 Kramer, We The Court, supra note 11, at 99-104. He further explains:
As the new politics settled and became normalized, the role of "the people" in it slowly changed. By serving as mediating institutions between governed and governors, parties obscured the formerly sharp theoretical distinction that had existed between them. . . . [A]nd because party politics was all about winning office, popular politics ceased to be something that operated from outside the formal system as a check on its political institutions. The "voice of the people," as such, was now expressed by elected representatives responding to political signals and popular movements. 36 See KRAMER, PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 11, at 213-26 (discussing the "New Deal settlement," which entails a judicial review deferential to political (read: legislative) assertions of constitutionality). See also Alexander & Solum, Popular?, supra note 11, at 1600-02. 37 Doing so "is important, if for no other reason than the certainty that our own sense of the good will be improved by a more catholic sense of the possible." Kramer, Circa 2004, supra note 11, at 980. On this "catholic sense," see SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 18-51 (1988). 38 Id.
constitutionalists must "control the Supreme Court" by "deflecting . . . arguments that constitutional law is too complex or difficult for ordinary citizens." modern-era popular constitutionalism, however, is that we rediscover and assert with force our role as authoritative constitutional interpreters.
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It is surprising that he does not observe some of the ways in which political and constitutional change actually happens in ways of which he would approve. We still exercise today some of the same basic forms of resistance as did our colonial forebears: We still vote, exercise the right to petition and assemble, and make public denouncements. But so too do community mores still mark the limits of official action in other informal ways, even outside the First Amendment, whose jurisprudence explicitly invokes "community standards of decency." 48 See also Siegel, Social Movement Conflict, supra note 11 (arguing that the "de facto ERA," a series of cases in which the Supreme Court came to understand gender discrimination as violative of the Equal Protection Clause, was produced not solely by judicial review or by ambient and amorphous "culture," but by a dialectic of claims on constitutional meaning by feminist and anti-feminist social movements between the late 1960s and early 1980s). 49 Siegel, Text in Contest, supra note 47, at 303 (" [D] ialogue between citizenry and judiciary about constitutional meaning is far more commonplace in our constitutional order than constitutional theory commonly acknowledges."). 50 Id. at 312-13. 51 Id. at 316-18 (characterizing an article against whose argument she is writing as offering a "high degree of normative coherence").
them," 52 we cannot determine that particular actions do not have constitutional value based solely on the forum in which they occur.
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Siegel has done much in studying politics and social movements and locating them on the frontier between law and society. Examining the nature of the claims that social movements make, she suggests that their arguments often sound in constitutional law because citizens understand the Constitution to allow them to do so: The first three words of that document--"We This Essay embraces an understanding of popular constitutionalism based on these studies, and the project of dismantling the politics/constitutional law distinction. Because the Constitution invokes, and is grounded in, popular sovereignty, we must give constitutional weight to these actions based on their democratic pedigree. As popular activity--The People's politics--demands on constitutional significance, the Constitution moves toward, and eventually "lives among," The People. The goal, and this Essay's normative orientation, is the acknowledgement of constitutional import in the political engagement and socio-political pressures by which personal and group relationships form, and solutions to conflicts are negotiated.
B. Law, The Constitution, and Politics
Siegel's insight is well grounded in a history that dictates and corresponds to her description of constitutional change. 62 In understand and define popular constitutionalism by its insistence that constitutions live among people.
Part III returns to this "among people" definition of popular constitutionalism to assess its effects on our understanding of initiative constitutionalism and thus of the MCRI. First, Part II introduces the MCRI and addresses the forms of citizen engagement imagined by initiative constitutionalism.
II. INITIATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: FETISHIZING TEXTS
In 1995, Jennifer Gratz was waitlisted for admission by the University of Michigan--the only institution of higher education to which she had applied. 87 A notable portion of the rhetoric, however, was also shaped by the form in which this particular constitutional change would happen: By a "direct democracy" ballot initiative on which Michiganders would vote directly, and with which they could change the constitution's text. The MCRI passed by a 58-42 percent margin. 88 My purpose here is not to criticize Gratz or those who rose up in opposition to the MCRI, or to engage in the merits of their disagreement. 89 Their passion was not misplaced: The textual changes wrought by the MCRI has, and will continue to have, substantial effects on universities and university applicants, business owners contracting with the city, and many others. 90 So too will the passage of the MCRI have a substantial impact on the discourse of affirmative action both in Michigan and nationwide. This Essay also declines to criticize their election-day focus.
It was not irrational for the MCRI's proponents and opponents to focus on ballot initiative elections as moments of constitutional change or on constitutional texts as sites of that change.
After all, the text of Michigan's constitution as well as the kind of state action it had been understood to allow both changed drastically because of votes cast on November 7. Nor does this Essay seek to attack ballot initiatives per se.
Instead, I employ Gratz's and others' words to explore notions of constitutional change underpinning ballot initiatives, the mechanism with which these advocates were all immediately concerned. I call these notions "initiative constitutionalism"; its nature underpins this Essay's argument that ballot initiatives are not popular constitutionalist enterprises. The subset of the debate over the MCRI that addresses and/or implicates initiative constitutionalism reflects those characteristics of initiative constitutionalism that puts it at odds with the definition of popular constitutionalism elaborated in Part I. By focusing so heavily on an initiative's potential to modify a constitution's text, initiative constitutionalism obstinately fails to accord popular action itself any independent, constitutionally relevant weight.
A. Debating the MCRI
For both proponents and opponents of the MCRI, November 7, 2006 was an important day. "With the Nov. 7 election drawing near, both sides in the affirmative-action debate are ramping up their efforts to convince undecided Michiganders how they should vote on Proposal 2," observed one news report in late October. 91 The month before, one commentator wrote, "This November, we face a critical decision which has huge implications for women."
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Reacting to poll numbers indicating declining support for the MCRI, Gratz said, "Until people sit down and read the language, the numbers will bounce around. I think people will pay more attention as the election gets closer." 93 And a spokesman for One United Michigan said before the election that organizing to defeat the proposal "is tough. Two years ago, the initial polling found more than two-thirds supported the proposition. The miracle is that we've gotten it into a winnable range."
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This focus on the election was entirely understandable. With the initiative on the ballot, the election results would (and did) change the text of the state's constitution. Its outcome would (and does) affect a number of important issues, including whether the University of Michigan's affirmative action programs would be left intact and whether municipalities could seek to contract specifically with minority-and women-owned businesses.
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The outcome of the election effected a change in the text of Michigan's constitution, the legal instrument granting the government the power to constitute itself and to govern the state's citizens. Gratz recognized the "basic law" nature of the document whose text she sought to change; she explained the initiative in terms referencing "the people" and thus sounding in popular sovereignty. When a federal court ruled against plaintiffs who had alleged fraud in themselves, but only inasmuch as they would lead her to vote against that proposal.
Simultaneously, while popular sovereignty entails that The People are "entitled" to produce constitutional changes, they are to do this through "a full debate and vote," not through protest and contestation, which is valuable only if used to convince voters to vote for or against proposed changes. In other words, the protest itself holds no value for constitutional meaning; it only holds value in a war for votes. These ideas follow logically from a theory where constitutional change results only from election results.
B. Initiative Constitutionalism and The Political Imagination
Gratz was not alone in equating constitutional law and the Constitution--that is, equating constitutional meaning with constitutional text. Michigan Governor Jennifer M. Granholm The Michigan Civil Rights Initiative, if approved by voters in November, would spell the end for many programs and practices used by government agencies, universities and public schools that provide targeted help for women and minorities in hiring, contracting and admissions.
But judges will decide which programs and practices end.
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This Free Press news report was not alone in its conclusion. For popular constitutionalism, community is "instantiated" by the social, political, and legal debates that take place daily because these debates are assumed to have constitutional valence. 115 It is the "constitutional culture" 116 produced by this constant engagement, rather than any single or particular constitutional rule, that is at the core of popular constitutionalism. Under initiative constitutionalism, a society's laws are merely a set of rules. Under popular constitutionalism, by contrast, a society's laws are remarkable primarily for the engaging, genuinely reflective process through which they are produced. The appeal of popular constitutionalism, therefore, is in the society it promises, rather than merely the particular rules under which its members may choose to live. Issues remain live, and up for debate, all the time.
To live in a popular constitutionalist society, citizens must have the energy and imagination to conceive and reconceive, continually, the rules under which they live.
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These systems leave judicial review in two very different places. As we have seen, a theory that commits to judicial actors primary responsibility for and authority over constitutional change--even one in which The People themselves have the power to modify their constitution at isolated and distinct moments--is fundamentally not popular constitutionalism. Though as concepts judicial review and popular control over constitutional meaning need not be mutually exclusive, neither are they fully compatible. 118 We must compromise between them. 119 Popular constitutionalism and initiative constitutionalism balance between judicial review and popular expression in vastly different ways. In the former, judicial review is generally subordinated to a multitude of popular political expressions so that the constitution can live among people; the latter leaves to The People a role in making constitutional meaning far too circumscribed to be considered a species of the former.
Pursuing this logic, Part III compares popular and initiative constitutionalisms in terms of the agentive capacity each gives to the people in making constitutional meaning.
117 Cf. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE, supra note 12, at 74 (describing constitutional debates in colonial-era New York thus: "Constitutional discourse was the site where all these social groups, from the elite to the popular, interacted to assert their interests and make sense of their shared colonial world."). 118 See Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 18. 119 See supra note 36 (noting "New Deal settlement" in KRAMER, PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 11). See also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
III. DISAGGREGATING "THE PEOPLE" FROM "THE PEOPLE"
Kramer and Siegel, of course, are not alone in writing about popular constitutionalism.
In vitality and responsiveness" to the citizenry's political concerns. 123 And he is not alone in linking the ballot initiative to direct democracy, 124 and from there to popular constitutionalism.
Indeed, citizen lawmaking mechanisms like the initiative and referendum seem, at first glance, to be considered the paradigmatic tool of the popular constitutionalist. The Supreme Court has endorsed this view, agreeing that tools of direct democracy like the initiative and referendum allow the deployment of popular sovereignty: Observing that "[u]nder our constitutional assumptions, all power derives from the people," the Court has held that mechanisms like the initiative must be understood as "means for direct political participation" rather than incursions into legislative power. Ballot initiatives are not without their problems, however. Many scholars have documented the public choice problems that inhere to procedures by which ballot initiatives amend state constitutions. 128 Perhaps the most common of these critiques are that initiatives promote undeliberative or uneducated decisionmaking; they are prone to control by wealthy individuals; their language is often unclear or obfuscatory; and they effect insubstantial or bad changes. 129 The MCRI is not immune to these critiques.
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Nonetheless, this Essay bypasses these public choice critiques and fastens instead upon a "populist critique" of citizen lawmaking mechanisms to explain why ballot initiatives like the MCRI are--for whatever else they might be--not tools that let constitutions "live[] among
people" in the way popular constitutionalism means them to. In A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 131 Sherman Clark lays out a simple but profound observation about the nature of initiatives: They ask voters to decide one question of public policy at a time. The consequence is a far-reaching condemnation of "direct democracy" that is untethered from public choice theory critiques attaching to specific processes by which particular initiatives become law.
In Clark's account, by producing isolated moments of citizen lawmaking, ballot initiatives are able to capture a polity's preferences, but not its priorities. For Clark the term "priority" captures two ideas: One, the intensity of a voter's preference for a given outcome; and There are two consequences to this fact. First, in a ballot initiative regime, a citizen is unable to choose among a set of outcomes the one that is her preferred, but not ideal, one.
Because "non-congruent majorities" will pass different initiatives, a lawmaking regime should not account for majoritarian preferences on a distinct issue as though it were the only issue to be decided by the polity. Instead, it should also account for the intensity of polity members' inconsistency. Initiative constitutionalism does not, and cannot, account for the dynamism and constancy of engagement that defines popular constitutionalism because its model is too focused on the constitutional text its protagonists wish to change. Proponents of citizen lawmaking focus on the elections at which ballot initiatives are approved or rejected, and imagine popular sovereignty as occurring at particular times and places. And this understanding of popular sovereignty inheres to all election-centric understandings of popular political expression.
Statements by Gratz, who defended the placement of the MCRI on the ballot as being an opportunity for "The People" to speak, 150 also betray an understanding of civic engagement--and of the expression of popular sovereignty--that begins and ends with the ballot box. They indicate that initiative constitutionalism's understanding of constitutional change is far narrower than that of popular constitutionalism's.
In other words, initiative constitutionalism fetishizes constitutional texts, and by doing so, it encourages us to entomb constitutions in glass cases. Because it is so sacred, constitutional text can be changed only in extraordinary moments like elections. 151 And once changed, the (judicial) query into constitutional meaning begins anew. By contrast, from the vantage point of the popular constitutionalism project, popular sovereignty--the engagement with and acknowledgement of social movements and moments of activism in the making of constitutional meaning, interpretation, and enforcement--is not tied so closely to constitutional text, and so this model does not fetishize constitutional texts. Rather, it understands constitutional change to occur both on and off the books.
150 Supra text accompanying notes 96-99. 151 Certainly, elections are far less extraordinary than the "constitutional moments" that Bruce Ackerman argues are when constitutional meaning is fundamentally changed by the mobilization of a tangible popular sovereignty. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 11, at 266-94. But the changes that ballot initiatives visit on constitutions are also narrower in scope than Ackerman's constitutional moments: they apply only to a single state and thus cannot violate the U.S. Constitution's strictures.
Textual changes are certainly fundamental modifications of constitutional meaning; but so too are the nontextual changes that The People can effect when a theory and practice of constitutional change gives them room to act. People must make choices, but they do so all the time, not only (or even especially) on election day. They choose the organizations to which they will send annual contributions, and which ones they will join; they choose which op-eds or letters-to-the-editor they will write; they choose the candidates for whom to vote, or, perhaps, for whom to volunteer; they choose whether to express outrage at particular prosecutions, or at particular police actions. Popular constitutionalism gives The People room to act in these kinds of major and minor ways. Popular constitutionalism recognizes constitutional value in these daily actions and interactions, and thus it blurs the distinction between politics and constitutional law. This is how it locates constitutional change on the ground 152 and lets the constitution live among people. This is the recognition initiative constitutionalism cannot make, and it is why initiative constitutionalism is not, and cannot be, popular constitutionalism.
IV. CONCLUSION: RECOVERING CATEGORIES
Claims on constitutional meaning characterize much of modern American political discourse. In part this is true because the Constitution explicitly invokes popular sovereignty in its preamble and invites these claims, and The People take the Constitution up on this invitation.
But it is also true because Americans fetishize constitutions, holding their texts sacred and their meanings unchangeable by ordinary politics. Because of the former, social movements coalesce around constitutional politics and citizen-activists constantly make claims on constitutional meaning. But because of the latter, Americans focus on events like ballot initiatives and elections as rare moments of proper constitutional change, and thus as paradigmatic moments during which The People speak.
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The task of this Essay has been to disaggregate these two reasons for the proliferation of constitutional language in political discourse. It has done so by suggesting a way to define the popular constitutionalist project in relation to constitutional claims, that is, not in broad generalities but rather with respect to the daily social and political practices in which the project imagines citizens engaging. Unlike initiative constitutionalism, popular constitutionalism engages the constitution as it is lived and experienced "among people" and "in action," not as it has been "entombed in a glass case."
This distinction is important for a number of reasons; paramount among them is that to understand our actions as citizens, we must properly contextualize them in theories of democracy and popular sovereignty. By conflating multiple forms of nonjudicial constitutional change into the single category "popular constitutionalism," we strip that category of its meaning and let the act of categorizing do the work we should instead reserve for a debate on an initiative's merits.
In this instance, removing ballot initiatives like the MCRI from the "popular constitutionalism" basket allows us to understand and critique them from a clearer vantage point, divorced from the basic rubrics by which we might judge popular constitutionalism. So situated, we might criticize the MCRI on the merits of its effects, or the motivations of its advocates, or the specific procedures by which it was proposed and passed. The object now is to study it on its own terms without letting the glow of popular constitutionalism, now a fashionable academic project, become an obscuring glare.
